Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 6 (1998)

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274

BUCHANAN v. ANGELONE

Opinion of the Court

give instructions singling out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. Id., at 39-40.

The jury was instructed that once it reached a decision on its two options, imposing a life sentence or imposing the death penalty, the foreman should sign the corresponding verdict form. The death penalty verdict form stated that the jury had unanimously found petitioner's conduct to be vile and that "having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense," it unanimously fixed his punishment at death. Id., at 77. When the jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty, the court read the verdict form and polled each juror on his agreement with the verdict.

The court, after a statutorily mandated sentencing hearing, see Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (1995), subsequently imposed the sentence fixed by the jury. On direct appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reviewed Buchanan's sentence for proportionality, see Va. Code Ann. §§ 17.110.1-17.110.2 (1996), and affirmed his conviction and death sentence. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S. E. 2d 757 (1989), cert. denied sub nom. Buchanan v. Virginia, 493 U. S. 1063 (1990).

Petitioner then sought federal habeas relief. The District Court denied the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 103 F. 3d 344 (1996). That court recognized that the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital sentencing jury's discretion be " 'guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty' " in order to eliminate arbitrariness and capriciousness. Id., at 347 (quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 258 (1976)). However, relying on our decision in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 890 (1983), and on its own precedent, the court concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not require States to adopt specific standards for instructing juries on mitigating circumstances. 103 F. 3d, at 347. It therefore held that by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, Virginia's sentencing procedure satisfied the Eighth

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