420
Stevens, J., dissenting
that Congress did not intend any such result. As Justice Ginsburg has explained, it seems equally clear that Congress did not intend to make every "exculpatory no" a felony.1
Even if that were not clear, I believe the Court should show greater respect for the virtually uniform understanding of the bench and the bar that persisted for decades with, as Justice Ginsburg notes, ante, at 414-415, the approval of this Court as well as the Department of Justice.2 See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 192-198 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 362-364, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).3 Or, as Sir Edward Coke phrased it, "it is the common opinion, and communis
1 "[M]eaning in law depends upon an understanding of purpose. Law's words, however technical they may sound, are not magic formulas; they must be read in light of their purposes, if we are to avoid essentially arbitrary applications and harmful results." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 324 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2 It merits emphasis that the Memorandum for the United States filed in support of its confession of error in Nunley v. United States, 434 U. S. 962 (1977), contains a detailed discussion of the many cases that had endorsed the "exculpatory no" doctrine after the 1934 amendment to § 1001. Memorandum for United States in Nunley v. United States, O. T. 1977, No. 77-5069, pp. 4-8.
3 Although I do not find the disposition of this case as troublesome as the decision in McNally, this comment is nevertheless apt:
"Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Court's action today is its casual—almost summary—rejection of the accumulated wisdom of the many distinguished federal judges who have thoughtfully considered and correctly answered the question these cases present. The quality of this Court's work is most suspect when it stands alone, or virtually so, against a tide of well-considered opinions issued by state or federal courts. In these cases I am convinced that those judges correctly understood the intent of the Congress that enacted this statute. Even if I were not so persuaded, I could not join a rejection of such a longstanding, consistent interpretation of a federal statute." McNally v. United States, 483 U. S., at 376-377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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