Cite as: 522 U. S. 448 (1998)
Syllabus
Petitioner Regions Hospital (Hospital) is eligible for GME cost reimbursement. A reaudit commenced in late 1990 yielded a determination that the Hospital's total allowable 1984 GME costs were $5,916,868, down from the original NAPR of $9,892,644. The recomputed average per-resident amount was $49,805, in contrast to the original $70,662. The Secretary sought to use this recomputed amount to determine reimbursements for future years and past years within the three-year window. The Secretary did not attempt to recoup excessive reimbursement paid to the Hospital for its 1984 GME costs, for the three-year window had already closed on that year. Appealing to the PRRB, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. The PRRB responded that it lacked authority to invalidate the rule. On expedited review, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that § 1395ww(h)(2)(A)'s language was ambiguous, that the reaudit rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription, and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible "retroactive rule." The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held:
1. The Secretary's reaudit rule is not impermissibly retroactive. The rule is in full accord with Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, which explained that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law existing when the conduct took place, id., at 265, but further clarified that a prescription is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation, id., at 270, n. 24. The reaudit rule calls for the correct application of the cost reimbursement principles in effect at the time the costs were incurred, not the application of any new reimbursement principles. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 207. Furthermore, the re-audits leave undisturbed the actual reimbursements for 1984 and any later reporting years on which the three-year reopening window had closed. The adjusted reasonable cost figures resulting from the re-audits are to be used solely to calculate reimbursements for still open and future years. P. 456.
2. The reaudit rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment. Pp. 457-464.
(a) In determining whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference, a court asks first whether Congress' intent is clear as to the precise question at issue. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842. If, by employing traditional statutory construction tools, id., at 843, n. 9, the court determines that Congress' intent is clear, that ends the matter, id., at 842. But if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the specific issue,
449
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