Cite as: 522 U. S. 479 (1998)
O'Connor, J., dissenting
each such "group" would have its own "common bond of occupation." Section 109, however, cannot be considered a limitation on credit union membership if at the same time it permits such a limitless result.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the NCUA's current interpretation of § 109 is contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and is thus impermissible under the first step of Chevron.10 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
In determining that respondents have standing under the zone-of-interests test to challenge the National Credit Union Administration's (NCUA's) interpretation of the "common bond" provision of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U. S. C. § 1759, the Court applies the test in a manner that is contrary to our decisions and, more importantly, that all but eviscerates the zone-of-interests requirement. In my view, under a proper conception of the inquiry, "the interest sought to be protected by" respondents in this action is not "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the common bond provision. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
Respondents brought this suit under § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702. To establish their standing to sue here, respondents must demonstrate
10 We have no need to consider § 109's legislative history, which, as both courts below found, is extremely "murky" and a "slender reed on which to place reliance." 90 F. 3d, at 530 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
503
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