166
Opinion of the Court
Williams, supra, at 724-725, indicates to the contrary in a particular case. See also Johnson v. Yellow Cab, supra, at 389-390; Blackburn v. United States, 100 F. 3d 1426, 1435 (CA9 1996). The primary question (we repeat) is one of legislative intent: Does applicable federal law indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the particular state statute at issue?
III
We must now apply these principles to this case. The relevant federal murder statute—applicable only on federal enclaves—read as follows in 1993, the time of petitioner's crime:
"§ 1111. Murder "(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. "Any other murder is murder in the second degree. "(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, "Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree, shall suffer death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment', in which event he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life; "Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life." 18 U. S. C. § 1111 (1988 ed.).
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