Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
except where it is "displaced by specific laws enacted by Congress." Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 568 (1910). In other words, the ACA embodies Congress' "policy of general conformity to local law." United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U. S. 286, 289 (1958). The majority quotes these passages with approval, ante, at 160, yet ignores the principles of federalism upon which they rest.
A central tenet of federalism is concurrent jurisdiction over many subjects. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425, 435 (1819). One result of concurrent jurisdiction is that, outside federal enclaves, citizens can be subject to the criminal laws of both state and federal sovereigns for the same act or course of conduct. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 88-89 (1985). The ACA seeks to mirror the results of concurrent jurisdiction in enclaves where, but for its provisions, state laws would be suspended in their entirety. Congress chose this means to recognize and respect the power of both sovereigns. We should implement this principle by assimilating state law except where Congress has manifested a contrary intention in "specific [federal] laws." Franklin, supra, at 568. But see ante, at 163 (suggesting that persons within federal enclaves should not be "randomly subject" to state as well as federal law, even though both sovereigns regulate those outside enclaves).
The majority recognizes that assimilation is not barred simply because the conduct at issue could be punished under a federal statute. It is correct, then, to assume that assimilation depends on whether Congress has proscribed the same offense. Ante, at 161-162. Yet in trying to define the same offense, the majority asks whether assimilation would interfere with a federal policy, rewrite a federal offense, or intrude upon a field occupied by the Federal Government. Ante, at 164-165. The majority's standards are a roundabout way to ask whether specific federal laws conflict with state laws. The standards take too little note of the value of federalism and the concomitant presumption in favor of
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