200
Scalia, J., dissenting
(Q) After reading this statement would you sign it
(A) Yes
Anthony Bell
Det. William F. Ritz Det. Homer Pennington
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200 (1987), we declined to extend the "narrow exception" of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), beyond confessions that facially incriminate a defendant. Today the Court "concede[s] that Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially," ante, at 195, and "concede[s] that the jury must use inference to connect the statement in this redacted confession with the defendant," ibid., but nonetheless extends Bruton to confessions that have been redacted to delete the defendant's name. Because I believe the line drawn in Richardson should not be changed, I respectfully dissent.
The almost invariable assumption of the law is that jurors follow their instructions. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 324-325, n. 9 (1985). This rule "is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." Richardson, supra, at 211. We have held, for example, that the state may introduce evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for the purpose of sentencing enhancement, or statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), for the purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that such evidence may not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 (1967); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). The same applies to codefendant confessions:
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