Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 48 (1998)

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Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998)

Scalia, J., dissenting

so that not much will have been achieved. That begs the question, of course, as to how the constitutional doubt will be resolved. Moreover, where the doctrine of constitutional doubt does not apply, the same result may be dictated by the rule of lenity, which would preserve rather than destroy the criminal defendant's right to jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e. g., People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 195 N. Y., at 197, 88 N. E., at 40 ("It is unnecessary in this case to decide how great punishment the legislature may constitutionally authorize Courts of Special Sessions to impose on a conviction without a common-law jury. It is sufficient to say that in cases of doubtful construction or of conflicting statutory provisions, that interpretation should be given which best protects the rights of a person charged with an offense, to a trial according to the common law"). Whichever doctrine is applied for the purpose, it seems to me a sound principle that whenever Congress wishes a fact to increase the maximum sentence without altering the substantive offense, it must make that intention unambiguously clear. Accordingly, I would find that § 1326(b)(2) establishes a separate offense, and would reverse the judgment below.

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