Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 9 (1998)

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280

OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

Eighth Amendment decisions holding that additional procedural protections are required in capital cases, see, e. g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 637-638 (1980), respondent asserts that Dumschat does not control the outcome in this case because it involved only a liberty interest. Justice Stevens' dissent agrees on both counts. Post, at 291-292.

In Dumschat, an inmate claimed Connecticut's clemency procedure violated due process because the Connecticut Board of Pardons failed to provide an explanation for its denial of his commutation application. The Court held that "an inmate has 'no constitutional or inherent right' to commutation of his sentence." 452 U. S., at 464. It noted that, unlike probation decisions, "pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review." Ibid. The Court relied on its prior decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1 (1979), where it rejected the claim "that a constitutional entitlement to release [on parole] exists independently of a right explicitly conferred by the State." Dumschat, 452 U. S., at 463-464. The individual's interest in release or commutation " 'is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined,' " and that interest has already been extinguished by the conviction and sentence. Id., at 464 (quoting Greenholtz, supra, at 7). The Court therefore concluded that a petition for commutation, like an appeal for clemency, "is simply a unilateral hope." 452 U. S., at 465.

Respondent's claim of a broader due process interest in Ohio's clemency proceedings is barred by Dumschat. The process respondent seeks would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a

application process. Otherwise, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, he is asserting merely a protected interest in process itself, which is not a cognizable claim. 107 F. 3d 1178, 1184 (CA6 1997); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 249-250 (1983).

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