United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 35 (1998)

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Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998)

Stevens, J., dissenting

mon sense suggests that the testimony of disinterested third parties that is relevant to the jury's credibility determination will assist rather than impair the jury's deliberations. As with the reliance on the potential unreliability of this type of evidence, the reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of this testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the average American.26

Collateral Litigation

The potential burden of collateral proceedings to determine the examiner's qualifications is a manifestly insufficient justification for a categorical exclusion of expert testimony. Such proceedings are a routine predicate for the admission of any expert testimony, and may always give rise to searching cross-examination. If testimony that is critical to a fair determination of guilt or innocence could be excluded for that reason, the right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense would be an illusion.

It is incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the defendant to complain about the examinee's burden of proving that the test was properly conducted. While there may well be a need for substantial collateral proceedings when the party objecting to admissibility has a basis for questioning some aspect of the examination, it seems quite obvious that the Government is in no position to challenge

26 Indeed, research indicates that jurors do not "blindly" accept poly-graph evidence, but that they instead weigh polygraph evidence along with other evidence. Cavoukian & Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Poly-graph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 Law and Human Behavior 117, 123, 127-128, 130 (1980) (hereinafter Cavoukian & Hesle-grave); see also Honts & Perry 366-367. One study found that expert testimony about the limits of the polygraph "completely eliminated the effect of the polygraph evidence" on the jury. Cavoukian & Heslegrave 128-129 (emphasis added).

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