442
Opinion of Stevens, J.
V
The words "stereotype," "stereotyping," and "stereotypical" are used repeatedly in petitioner's and her amici's briefs. They note that we have condemned statutory classifications that rest on the assumption that gender may serve as a proxy for relevant qualifications to serve as the administrator of an estate, Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), to engage in professional nursing, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982), or to train for military service, United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515 (1996), to name a few examples. Moreover, we have expressly repudiated cases that rested on the assumption that only the members of one sex could suitably practice law or tend bar. See Hogan, 458 U. S., at 725, n. 10 (commenting on Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948)). Discrimination that "is merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females" is unacceptable. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
The gender equality principle that was implicated in those cases is only indirectly involved in this case for two reasons.20
First, the conclusion that petitioner is not a citizen rests on several coinciding factors, not just the gender of her citizen parent. On the facts of this case, even if petitioner's mother had been a citizen 21 and her father had been the alien, petitioner would not qualify for citizenship because her mother has never been to the United States. Alternatively, if her citizen parent had been a female member of the Air Force and, like Mr. Miller, had returned to the States at the end of her tour of duty, § 1409 quite probably would have been irrelevant and petitioner would have become a citizen at
20 Of course, the sex of the person claiming citizenship is irrelevant; if she were a male, petitioner's case would be no stronger.
21 Theoretically she might have been the child of an American soldier stationed in the Philippines during World War II. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F. 3d 801, 802 (CA9 1995), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1043 (1996).
Page: Index Previous 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007