540
Syllabus
standard is altogether consistent with AEDPA's central concern that the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong actual innocence showing. The rules applicable in all cases where the court recalls its mandate further ensure the practice is limited to the most rare and extraordinary case. Moreover, like other applicable habeas standards, this rule is objective in content, well defined in the case law, and familiar to federal courts. McCleskey, supra, at 496. Pp. 558-559.
(c) The miscarriage of justice standard was not met in this case. The standard is concerned with actual, as compared to legal, innocence. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333, 339. To be credible, the claim must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 324. A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Id., at 327. A capital petitioner challenging his death sentence in particular must show "by clear and convincing evidence" that no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty in light of the new evidence. Sawyer, supra, at 348. Thompson's claims fail under either standard. The record of his first federal habeas petition governs his actual innocence claim. He presents little evidence to undermine the trial evidence. The prosecution presented ample evidence showing that he committed rape, and his own testimony—riddled with inconsistencies and false-hoods—was devastating. Neither the additional evidence he presented to impeach the credibility of two jailhouse informants nor a pathologist's testimony disputing opinions of prosecution trial witnesses meets the "more likely than not" showing necessary to vacate his stand-alone rape conviction, much less the "clear and convincing" showing necessary to vacate his death sentence. There is no basis for a miscarriage of justice finding. Pp. 559-566.
120 F. 3d 1045, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 566.
Holly D. Wilkens, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dane
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