Cite as: 523 U. S. 574 (1998)
Opinion of the Court
made by the Court of Appeals in this case, however, lacks any common-law pedigree and alters the cause of action itself in a way that undermines the very purpose of § 1983—to provide a remedy for the violation of federal rights.16
In the past, we have consistently declined similar invitations to revise established rules that are separate from the qualified immunity defense. We refused to change the Federal Rules governing pleading by requiring the plaintiff to anticipate the immunity defense, Gomez, 446 U. S., at 639- 640, or requiring pleadings of heightened specificity in cases alleging municipal liability, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164-169 (1993). We also declined to craft an exception to settled rules of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and rejected the argument that the policies behind the immunity defense justify interlocutory appeals on questions of evidentiary sufficiency. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 317-318 (1995). Our reasons for those unanimous rulings apply with equal force to the imposition of a clear and convincing burden of proof in cases alleging unconstitutional motive.
As we have noted, the Court of Appeals adopted a heightened proof standard in large part to reduce the availability of discovery in actions that require proof of motive. To the extent that the court was concerned with this procedural issue, our cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process. See, e. g., Leatherman, 507 U. S., at 168-169. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' indirect effort to regulate discovery employs a blunt instrument that carries a high cost, for its rule also imposes a heightened standard of proof at trial upon plaintiffs with bona fide con-16 Ironically, the heightened standard of proof directly limits the availability of the remedy in cases involving the specific evil at which the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the predecessor of § 1983) was originally aimed—race discrimination. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 174-175 (1961).
595
Page: Index Previous 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007