Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 5 (1998)

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618

BOUSLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

er's guilty plea was involuntary because he was misinformed about the elements of a § 924(c)(1) offense, that this claim was not waived by his guilty plea, and that his conviction should therefore be vacated. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order of dismissal. Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F. 3d 284 (CA8 1996).

We then granted certiorari, 521 U. S. 1152 (1997), to resolve a split among the Circuits over the permissibility of post-Bailey collateral attacks on § 924(c)(1) convictions obtained pursuant to guilty pleas.1 Because the Government disagreed with the Court of Appeals' analysis, we appointed amicus curiae to brief and argue the case in support of the judgment below. 522 U. S. 990 (1997).

A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is "voluntary" and "intelligent." Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970). We have long held that a plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process." Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334 (1941). Amicus contends that petitioner's plea was intelligently made because, prior to pleading guilty, he was provided with a copy of his indictment, which charged him with "using" a firearm. Such circumstances, standing alone, give rise to a presumption that the defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637, 647 (1976); id., at 650 (White, J., concurring). Petitioner nonetheless maintains that his guilty plea was unintelligent because the District Court subsequently misinformed him as to the elements of a § 924(c)(1) offense. In other words, petitioner contends that the record reveals that neither he, nor his counsel, nor the court correctly understood the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged. Were

1 See United States v. Carter, 117 F. 3d 262 (CA5 1997); Lee v. United States, 113 F. 3d 73 (CA7 1997); United States v. Barnhardt, 93 F. 3d 706 (CA10 1996); In re Hanserd, 123 F. 3d 922 (CA6 1997).

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