Cite as: 523 U. S. 637 (1998)
Thomas, J., dissenting
to or before a person. The act of making a request for something." Black's Law Dictionary 98-99 (6th ed. 1990); see also Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 97 (1991) (application is a "request, petition . . . a form used in making a request"). Respondent's March 1993 federal habeas petition was clearly a habeas "application" (the Court concedes as much), because it placed before the District Court respondent's request for a writ of habeas corpus. Once this application was denied, however, none of respondent's claims for relief--including his claim that he was incompetent to be executed--remained before the Court. It was thus necessary for respondent to file a new request for habeas relief so that his Ford claim would again be "pu[t] to" or "plac[ed] before" the District Court. (The Court certainly did not raise respondent's Ford claim sua sponte.) Respondent's May 1997 request for relief was therefore a habeas application distinct from his earlier requests for relief, and it was thus undoubtedly "second or successive."
Respondent's Ford claim was also "presented" in both his March 1993 and his May 1997 habeas applications. To "pre-sent" is "to bring or introduce into the presence of someone" or "to lay (as a charge) before a court as an object of inquiry." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 930 (1991). Respondent clearly "presented" his Ford claim in both his 1993 and his 1997 habeas applications, for in each he introduced to the District Court his argument that he is not competent to be executed. Under the plain meaning of the statute, therefore, respondent's Ford claim was a "claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . that was presented in a prior application." § 2244(b)(1).
The reasons offered by the Court for disregarding the plain language of the statute are unpersuasive. Conceding that "[t]his may have been the second time that respondent had asked the federal courts to provide relief on his Ford claim," ante, at 643, the Court nevertheless concludes that respondent has really filed only "one application for habeas
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