Cite as: 523 U. S. 653 (1998)
Opinion of Breyer, J.
filing of a threatened suit by the patentee; the validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory Judgment Act").
I cannot find any reason for an exception that would forbid "reverse" declaratory judgment actions in labor law contexts such as this one. To the contrary, this Court has suggested that the availability of declaratory judgment actions furthers the LMRA's basic purposes. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 454-455 (1957) (§ 301 designed to promote "industrial peace" by "provid[ing] the necessary legal remedies"); id., at 455-456 (quoting from floor statement of Representative Barden, 93 Cong. Rec. 3656-3657 (1947), that "the section . . . contemplates not only the ordinary lawsuits for damages but also such other remedial proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might be appropriate . . . [including a suit] under the Declaratory Judgments Act in order to secure declarations from the Court of legal rights under the contract"); Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 199 (1962) ("[Section] 301 is not to be given a narrow reading"). And the Government, in an amicus curiae brief, tells us that such an action would not interfere with the National Labor Relations Board's administration of federal labor law. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27 ("The Board . . . has concluded in this and other cases . . . that a suit under Section 301(a) to declare a contract voidable based on fraud in the inducement does not unduly intrude upon its authority").
Thus Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction would lie in a case like this one, provided, however, that the declaratory judgment plaintiff demonstrates an "actual controversy." 28 U. S. C. § 2201(a); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 239-240 (1937). The Union failed to make any such showing here, and for that reason I agree with the Court's ultimate conclusion.
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