740
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
Syllabus
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 97-391. Argued March 24, 1998—Decided May 26, 1998
Chapter 154 of 28 U. S. C., part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, provides, inter alia, an expedited review process— including a 180-day filing period, 28 U. S. C. § 2263(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II)—for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. Proceedings against other States are governed by Chapter 153, which has a 1-year filing period, § 2244(d)(1), and lacks expedited procedures. After California officials, including petitioner state attorney general, indicated that they would invoke Chapter 154's protections, respondent, a state capital prisoner, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve whether the chapter applied to a class of capital prisoners whose convictions were affirmed after a particular date. The Federal District Court issued a declaratory judgment, holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154 and therefore the chapter did not apply to the class, and enjoined petitioners from invoking the chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioners' claim that the Eleventh Amendment barred respondent's suit; determined that the District Court had authority to issue a declaratory judgment under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act; and rejected petitioners' contention that the injunction violated the First Amendment. Before reaching the Eleventh and First Amendment issues on which certiorari was granted, this Court must address whether the action is the type of "Article III" "case or controversy" to which federal courts are limited. See, e. g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 230-231.
Held: This action is not a justiciable case under Article III. The Declaratory Judgment Act validly confers jurisdiction on federal courts to enter declaratory judgments in cases where the controversy would admit "of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241. Here, rather than seeking a final or conclusive determination of the underlying controversy—whether respondent is entitled to federal habeas relief—respondent carved out of that claim only the ques-
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