Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 44 (1998)

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Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998)

Opinion of the Court

including injunctive relief and compensatory and exemplary damages"); 42 U. S. C. § 7622(d) ("In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages").

It is also the case that the Gwaltney opinion does not display the slightest awareness that anything turned upon whether the existence of a cause of action for past violations was technically jurisdictional—as indeed nothing of substance did. The District Court had statutory jurisdiction over the suit in any event, since continuing violations were also alleged. See 484 U. S., at 64. It is true, as Justice Stevens points out, that the issue of Article III standing which is addressed at the end of the opinion should technically have been addressed at the outset if the statutory question was not jurisdictional. But that also did not really matter, since Article III standing was in any event found. The short of the matter is that the jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of action in Gwaltney made no substantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that the Court seemed aware of), had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed without discussion by the Court. We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort (if Gwaltney can even be called a ruling on the point rather than a dictum) have no precedential effect. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996); Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 97 (1994); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952). But even if it is authoritative on the point as to the distinctive statute there at issue, it is fanciful to think that Gwaltney revised our established jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction, or adopted the expansive principle that a statute saying "the district court shall have jurisdiction to remedy violations [in specified ways]"

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