Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 12 (1998)

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136

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

"ships" or "receives") a firearm knowing it will be used to commit any "offense punishable by imprisonment for [more than] one year," § 924(b), and it has imposed a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence upon one who "carries" a firearm "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime," § 924(c). The first subsection imposes a less strict sentencing regime upon one who, say, ships firearms by mail for use in a crime elsewhere; the latter subsection imposes a mandatory sentence upon one who, say, brings a weapon with him (on his person or in his car) to the site of a drug sale.

Second, petitioners point out that, in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), we considered the related phrase "uses . . . a firearm" found in the same statutory provision now before us. See 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) ("uses or carries a firearm"). We construed the term "use" narrowly, limiting its application to the "active employment" of a firearm. Bailey, 516 U. S., at 144. Petitioners argue that it would be anomalous to construe broadly the word "carries," its statutory next-door neighbor.

In Bailey, however, we limited "use" of a firearm to "active employment" in part because we assumed "that Congress . . . intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning." Id., at 146. A broader interpretation of "use," we said, would have swallowed up the term "carry." Ibid. But "carry" as we interpret that word does not swallow up the term "use." "Use" retains the same independent meaning we found for it in Bailey, where we provided examples involving the displaying or the bartering of a gun. Ibid. "Carry" also retains an independent meaning, for, under Bailey, carrying a gun in a car does not necessarily involve the gun's "active employment." More importantly, having construed "use" narrowly in Bailey, we cannot also construe "carry" narrowly without undercutting the statute's basic objective. For the narrow interpretation would remove the act of carrying a gun in a car entirely from the statute's

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