Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)
Breyer, J., dissenting
v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 75-76 (1913). This principle suggests that the government must pay the current value of condemned land, not the added value that a highway it builds on the property itself creates. It also suggests that condemnation of, say, riparian rights in order to build a dam must be followed by compensation for these rights, not for the value of the electricity that the dam would later produce. Cf. id., at 76; Twin City Power Co., supra, at 226-228; United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 423-424, 427 (1940). Indeed, no one would say that such electricity was, for Takings Clause purposes, the owner's "private property," where, as here, in the absence of the lawful government "taking," there would have been no such property.
These legal analogies more directly address the key assumption raised by the question presented, namely, that "ab-sent the IOLTA program," no "interest" could have been earned. I consequently believe that the interest earned is not the client's "private property."
I respectfully dissent.
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