Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 10 (1998)

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20

FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. AKINS

Opinion of the Court

fering legal wrong" or "adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute" may seek judicial review of agency action).

Moreover, prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff " 'arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question.' " NCUA, supra, at 488 (quoting Data Processing, supra, at 153). The injury of which respondents complain— their failure to obtain relevant information—is injury of a kind that FECA seeks to address. Buckley, supra, at 66- 67 ("political committees" must disclose contributors and disbursements to help voters understand who provides which candidates with financial support). We have found nothing in the Act that suggests Congress intended to exclude voters from the benefits of these provisions, or otherwise to restrict standing, say, to political parties, candidates, or their committees.

Given the language of the statute and the nature of the injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from suffering the kind of injury here at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit. Consequently, respondents satisfy "prudential" standing requirements. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820, n. 3 (1997) (explicit grant of authority to bring suit "eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch").

Nor do we agree with the FEC or the dissent that Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit. Article III, of course, limits Congress' grant of judicial power to "cases" or "controversies." That limitation means that respondents must show, among other things, an "injury in fact"—a requirement that helps assure that courts will not "pass upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems," but adjudicate "concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries." Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Bennett,

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