Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)
Scalia, J., dissenting
ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.' " Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284-285 (1978), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).
Title 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any person to engage in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license. That provision is enforced criminally through § 924(a)(1)(D), which imposes criminal penalties on whoever "willfully violates any other provision of this chapter." The word "willfully" has a wide range of meanings, and " 'its construction [is] often . . . influenced by its context.' " Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 141 (1994), quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943). In some contexts it connotes nothing more than "an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental." United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394 (1933). In the present context, however, inasmuch as the preceding three subparagraphs of § 924 specify a mens rea of "knowingly" for other firearms offenses, see §§ 924(a)(1)(A)-(C), a "willful" violation under § 924(a)(1)(D) must require some mental state more culpable than mere intent to perform the forbidden act. The United States concedes (and the Court apparently agrees) that the violation is not "willful" unless the defendant knows in a general way that his conduct is unlawful. Brief for United States 7-9; ante, at 193 ("The jury must find that the defendant acted with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful").
That concession takes this case beyond any useful application of the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Everyone agrees that § 924(a)(1)(D) requires some knowledge of the law; the only real question is which law? The Court's answer is that knowledge of any law is enough—or, put another way, that the defendant must be ignorant of every law violated by his course of conduct to be innocent of willfully violating the licensing requirement. The Court points to no
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