American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 13 (1998)

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226

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.

Opinion of the Court

The Ninth Circuit distinguished respondent's claims from those in our filed-rate cases involving special services in one other respect: according to respondent, the "special services" that it sought were provided by petitioner, without charge, to other customers, 108 F. 3d, at 989, n. 9. Even if that were so, the claim for these services would still be pre-empted under the filed rate doctrine. To the extent respondent is asserting discriminatory treatment, its remedy is to bring suit under § 202 of the Communications Act.1 To the extent petitioner is claiming that its own claims for special services are not really special because other companies get the same preferences, "that would only tend to show that the practice was unlawful [with regard to] the others as well." United States v. Wabash R. Co., supra, at 413. Because respondent asks for privileges not included in the tariff, its state-law claims are barred in either case.

IV

Our analysis applies with equal force to respondent's tortious-interference claim because that is wholly derivative of the contract claim for additional and better services. Respondent contended that the tort claim was based on "AT&T's refusal to provide [respondent] with certain types of service" and the Magistrate Judge agreed, noting that " 'the claims in this case, even the tort claim, . . . stem from the alleged failure of AT&T to comply with its contractual relationship.' " 2 Brief for Appellant in Nos. 94-36116, 94-

1 Eight months after the close of discovery (and well after the 2-year statute of limitations in the Communications Act, § 415), respondent sought leave to file a second amended complaint to add a § 202 claim. The Magistrate Judge denied the request. Respondent did not appeal that ruling.

2 The dissent argues that "the jury's verdict on respondent's tort claim is supported by evidence that went well beyond, and differed in nature from, the contract claim," post, at 231, which the dissent asserts requires us to remand this case rather than reverse the judgment. This issue of noncontract evidence neither was included within the question presented

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