Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Moreover, because respondent assumed the statutory duty set out in Title IX as part of its consideration for the receipt of federal funds, that duty constitutes an affirmative undertaking that is more significant than a mere promise to obey the law.
Both of these considerations are reflected in our decision in Franklin. Explaining why Title IX is violated when a teacher sexually abuses a student, we wrote:
"Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex.' Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986). We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe." 503 U. S., at 75 (emphasis added).
Franklin therefore stands for the proposition that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher violates the duty— assumed by the school district in exchange for federal funds—not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and that a student may recover damages from a school district for such a violation.
Although the opinion the Court announces today is not entirely clear, it does not purport to overrule Franklin. See ante, at 281 ("Franklin thereby establishes that a school district can be held liable in damages in cases involving a teach-er's sexual harassment of a student"). Moreover, I do not understand the Court to question the conclusion that an intentional violation of Title IX, of the type we recognized in
against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices").
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