Cite as: 524 U. S. 308 (1998)
Opinion of the Court
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 119- 122 (1983). Congress modified this aspect of Dickerson by adopting the following language:
"What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive fire-arms." § 921(a)(20).
The first sentence and the first clause of the second sentence define convictions, pardons, expungements, and restorations of civil rights by reference to the law of the convicting jurisdiction. See Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 371 (1994).
Aside from the unless clause, the parties agree Massachusetts law has restored petitioner's civil rights. As for the unless clause, state law permits him to possess rifles and shotguns but forbids him to possess handguns outside his home or business. The question presented is whether the handgun restriction activates the unless clause, making the convictions count under federal law.
We note these preliminary points. First, Massachusetts restored petitioner's civil rights by operation of law rather than by pardon or the like. This fact makes no difference. Nothing in the text of § 921(a)(20) requires a case-by-case decision to restore civil rights to this particular offender. While the term "pardon" connotes a case-by-case determination, "restoration of civil rights" does not. Massachusetts has chosen a broad rule to govern this situation, and federal law gives effect to its rule. All Courts of Appeals to ad-
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