Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 14 (1998)

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370

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION AND PAROLE v. SCOTT

Souter, J., dissenting

Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1389 (1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 18-19, and n. 1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 828, and n. 22 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 978, and n. 37 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The Court's holding that the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), has no application to parole revocation proceedings rests upon mistaken conceptions of the actual function of revocation, of the objectives of those who gather evidence in support of petitions to revoke, and, consequently, of the need to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment that would tend to occur in administering the parole laws. In reality a revocation proceeding often serves the same function as a criminal trial, and the revocation hearing may very well present the only forum in which the State will seek to use evidence of a parole violation, even when that evidence would support an independent criminal charge. The deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is therefore implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a conventional trial, and the exclusionary rule should be applied accordingly. From the Court's conclusion to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.

This Court has said that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). Because the exclusionary rule thus "operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-

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