382
Syllabus
Second, the argument emphasizes the "jurisdictional" nature of the difference, since neither the law permitting supplemental jurisdiction, nor any other law, gives the federal court the power to decide a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Third, the argument looks to removal based upon "diversity jurisdiction" for analogical authority leading to its conclusion that the "jurisdictional" problem is so serious that the presence of even one Eleventh Amendment barred claim destroys removal jurisdiction with respect to all claims, i. e., the "case." The analogy is unconvincing, for this case differs significantly from diversity cases with respect to original jurisdiction. The presence of a nondiverse party automatically destroys such jurisdiction: No party need assert the defect. No party can waive the defect, or consent to jurisdiction. No court can ignore the defect; rather a court, noticing the defect, must raise the matter on its own. In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction. It grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity defense. The State can waive the defense, and a court may ignore the defect unless it is raised by the State. Since a federal court would have original jurisdiction to hear this case had Schacht originally filed it there, the defendants may remove the case from state to federal courts. Other conditions—e. g., the fact that removal jurisdiction is determined as of the time a case was filed in state court, which was before the defendants filed their answer in federal court—further undermine the analogy. Pp. 386-391.
(b) Schacht's one further argument—that, after the State asserted its Eleventh Amendment defense, the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire case and thus had to remand it to state court under § 1447(c)—is rejected. An ordinary reading of § 1447(c) indicates that it refers to an instance in which a federal court "lacks subject matter jurisdiction" over a "case," not simply over one claim within the case. Moreover, § 1447(c)'s objective—to specify the procedures that a federal court must follow in remanding a case after removal—is irrelevant to the question presented here. Pp. 391-393.
116 F. 3d 1151, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 393.
Richard Briles Moriarty, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007