Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 5 (1998)

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 399 (1998)

Opinion of the Court

tions to the privilege. 124 F. 3d, at 235. The Court of Appeals also held that the notes were not protected by the work-product privilege.

The dissenting judge would have affirmed the District Court's judgment that the attorney-client privilege protected the notes. Id., at 237. He concluded that the common-law rule was that the privilege survived death. He found no persuasive reason to depart from this accepted rule, particularly given the importance of the privilege to full and frank client communication. Id., at 237.

Petitioners sought review in this Court on both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege.1 We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. 1045 (1998), and we now reverse.

The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464, 470 (1888). The privilege is intended to encourage "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice." Upjohn, supra, at 389. The issue presented here is the scope of that privilege; more particularly, the extent to which the privilege survives the death of the client. Our interpretation of the privilege's scope is guided by "the principles of the common law . . . as interpreted by the courts . . . in the light of reason and experience." Fed. Rule Evid. 501; Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933).

The Independent Counsel argues that the attorney-client privilege should not prevent disclosure of confidential communications where the client has died and the information is relevant to a criminal proceeding. There is some authority for this position. One state appellate court, Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456, 357 A. 2d 689 (1976),

1 Because we sustain the claim of attorney-client privilege, we do not reach the claim of work-product privilege.

403

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