Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
principally justified because a contrary interpretation would render the Takings Clause unnecessary. See id., at 394 (opinion of Chase, J.). In an appropriate case, therefore, I would be willing to reconsider Calder and its progeny to determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Takings Clause jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Today's case, however, does present an unconstitutional taking, and I join Justice OTMConnor's well-reasoned opinion in full.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.
The plurality's careful assessment of the history and purpose of the statute in question demonstrates the necessity to hold it arbitrary and beyond the legitimate authority of the Government to enact. In my view, which is in full accord with many of the plurality's conclusions, the relevant portions of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act), 26 U. S. C. § 9701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. II), must be invalidated as contrary to essential due process principles, without regard to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I concur in the judgment holding the Coal Act unconstitutional but disagree with the plurality's Takings Clause analysis, which, it is submitted, is incorrect and quite unnecessary for decision of the case. I must record my respectful dissent on this issue.
I
The final Clause of the Fifth Amendment states:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5.
The provision is known as the Takings Clause. The concept of a taking under the Clause has become a term of art, and my discussion begins here.
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