United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 27 (1998)

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692

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

these values were reliable guides to the actual scope of protection under the Clause, they would be seen to demand a very high degree of protection indeed: "inviolability" is, after all, an uncompromising term, and we know as well from Fourth Amendment law as from a layman's common sense that breaches of privacy are complete at the moment of illicit intrusion, whatever use may or may not later be made of their fruits. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 264 (1990) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984)).

The Fifth Amendment tradition, however, offers no such degree of protection. If the Government is ready to provide the requisite use and derivative use immunity, see Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 453; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 84 (1973), the protection goes no further: no violation of personality is recognized and no claim of privilege will avail.13

One might reply that the choice of the word "inviolability" was just unfortunate; while testimonial integrity may not be inviolable, it is sufficiently served by requiring the Government to pay a price in the form of use (and derivative use) immunity before a refusal to testify will be overruled. But that answer overlooks the fact that when a witness's response will raise no fear of criminal penalty, there is no protection for testimonial privacy at all. See United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-255 (1980).

Thus, what we find in practice is not the protection of personal testimonial inviolability, but a conditional protection of testimonial privacy subject to basic limits recognized before

by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial" (citation omitted)).

13 The practice of exchanging silence for immunity is unchallenged here and presumably invulnerable, being apparently as old as the Fifth Amendment itself. See Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 445, and n. 13.

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