Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 26 (1998)

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

Thomas, J., dissenting

informs anyone in a position of authority about the super-visor's conduct. As a result, employer liability under Title VII is judged by different standards depending upon whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is alleged. The standard of employer liability should be the same in both instances: An employer should be liable if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent in permitting the supervisor's conduct to occur.

I

Years before sexual harassment was recognized as "discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex," 42 U. S. C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1), the Courts of Appeals considered whether, and when, a racially hostile work environment could violate Title VII.1 In the landmark case Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 957 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the practice of racially segregating patients in a doctor's office could amount to discrimination in " 'the terms, conditions, or privileges' " of employment, thereby violating Title VII. 454 F. 2d, at 238 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). The principal opinion in the case concluded that employment discrimination was not limited to the "isolated and distinguishable events" of "hiring, firing, and promoting." 454 F. 2d, at 238 (opinion of Goldberg, J.). Rather, Title VII could also be violated by a work environment "heavily polluted with discrimination," because of the deleterious effects of such an atmosphere on an employee's well-being. Ibid.

Accordingly, after Rogers, a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic

1 This sequence of events is not surprising, given that the primary goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eradicate race discrimination and that the statute's ban on sex discrimination was added as an eleventh-hour amendment in an effort to kill the bill. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F. 2d 983, 987 (CADC 1977).

767

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