Cite as: 525 U. S. 299 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
the McCarran-Ferguson Act," 827 F. Supp. 1498, 1521-1522 (Nev. 1993).5
The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. See 114 F. 3d 1467, 1482 (1997). In Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F. 3d 1486 (1995), a decision handed down after the District Court rejected the policy beneficiaries' right to sue under RICO in this case, the Court of Appeals adopted a "direct conflict" test for determining when a federal law "invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]" a state law governing insurance. As declared in Merchants Home, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude "application of a federal statute prohibiting acts which are also prohibited under a state's insurance laws." Id., at 1492. Guided by Merchants Home, and assuming that Nevada law provided for administrative remedies only, the Ninth Circuit held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar suit under RICO by the Humana Insurance policy beneficiaries. See 114 F. 3d, at 1480. Circuit courts have divided on the question presented: Does a federal law, which proscribes the same conduct as state law, but provides materially different remedies, "impair" state law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act? 6 We granted certiorari to address that question. 524 U. S. 936 (1998).
5 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals inaccurately projected Nevada law as allowing for administrative remedies only. See infra, at 311-313.
6 Compare Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F. 3d 1486, 1492 (CA9 1995), and NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F. 2d 287, 297 (CA7 1992) ("[S]tate and federal rules that are substantively identical but differ in penalty do not conflict with or displace each other."), with Doe v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N. A., 107 F. 3d 1297, 1307 (CA8 1997) ("[T]he intrusion of RICO's substantial damage provisions into a state's insurance regulatory program may so impair the state law as to bar application of RICO."), and Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N. A., 92 F. 3d 384, 392 (CA6 1996) ("The different liability under Ohio law for violations, as well as different standards of proof necessary to demonstrate misrepresentations, means that RICO does impair the ability of Ohio to regulate [unfair and deceptive acts].").
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