344
Scalia, J., concurring in part
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter"). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Clinton v. Glavin, No. 98- 564. As this decision also resolves the substantive issues presented by Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, No. 98-404, that case no longer presents a substantial federal question. The appeal in that case is therefore dismissed. Cf. Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U. S. 144, 145 (1971).
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, and with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy join as to Part II, concurring in part.
I
I join the opinion of the Court, excluding, of course, the plurality's resort in Part III-B to what was said by individual legislators and committees of legislators—or more precisely (and worse yet), what was not said by individual legislators and committees of legislators. I write separately to respond at somewhat greater length to Justice StevensTM analysis of 13 U. S. C. § 141(a), to add several additional points of textual analysis, and to invoke the doctrine of constitutional doubt, which is a major factor in my decision.
II
Section 141(a) requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a "decennial census of population . . . in such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys." Justice Stevens reasons that a reading of § 195 that would prohibit sampling for apportionment purposes contradicts this provision. It
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