Cite as: 525 U. S. 33 (1998)
Syllabus
incorporates all of the refinements associated with it. Petitioner's argument that the failure to explain all the intricacies of a term of art in a contract is bad faith has no logical stopping point; that argument would require that all the intricacies of every term used in a contract be spelled out. Pp. 44-48.
2. Because petitioner's challenge to the union security clause's grace period provision was based purely on an alleged inconsistency with the statute, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over it. A challenge to an action that is "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA]" is within the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 245, but a claim alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation is cognizable in federal court, e. g., Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 177-183. However, the mere incantation of the phrase "duty of fair representation" is insufficient to invoke the primary jurisdiction of federal courts. When a plaintiff's only claim is that the union violated the NLRA, the plaintiff cannot avoid the NLRB's jurisdiction by characterizing this alleged statutory violation as a breach of the duty of fair representation. See Beck, 487 U. S., at 743. To invoke federal jurisdiction when the claim is based in part on an NLRA violation, the plaintiff must adduce facts suggesting that the union's statutory violation was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Although federal courts have power to resolve § 7 and § 8 issues that arise as collateral matters in a duty of fair representation suit, ibid., this does not open the door for federal court first instance resolution of all statutory claims. Applying these principles in this case, petitioner's challenge falls squarely within the NLRB's primary jurisdiction. Petitioner's argument that her challenge is structurally identical to the duty of fair representation claim considered in Beck is rejected because the latter claim was not premised on the mere unlawfulness of the union's conduct, but on the fact that such conduct was arbitrary and possibly in bad faith. Her challenge to the membership and fees requirements discussed above is similarly distinguishable. Pp. 49-54.
124 F. 3d 1034, affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 52.
Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Leo Geffner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Ira L. Gottlieb, Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold.
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