Cite as: 525 U. S. 366 (1999)
Opinion of Breyer, J.
cations Commission (FCC) to promulgate the pricing and unbundling rules before us.
I
The FCC's pricing rules fall outside its delegated authority because both (1) a century of regulatory history establishes state authority as the local telephone service ratemaking norm and (2) the 1996 Act nowhere changes, or creates an exception to, that norm. Justice ThomasTM opinion describes the history that has created the norm. Ante, at 402- 404. In my view, the Act's purposes, its language, relevant precedent, and the nature of the FCC's rules provide added support for his conclusion.
A
The Act's purposes help explain why its language and structure foresee not national rate uniformity, but traditional local ratemaking—FCC views to the contrary notwithstanding. See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, ¶ 113, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15558 (1996) (First Report & Order). To understand those purposes, one must recall that AT&T once dominated the national telecommunications industry. It controlled virtually all long-distance telephone service, most local telephone service, and a substantial amount of all telephone equipment manufacturing. See generally United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 165 (DC 1982) (describing AT&T's "commanding position" in the Nation's telecommunications business), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U. S. 1001 (1983). In 1982, however, AT&T entered into an antitrust consent decree, which ended its industry dominance. See 552 F. Supp., at 160-170.
The decree split AT&T from its local telephone service subsidiaries. By doing so, the decree sought to encourage new competition in long-distance service by firms such as MCI and Sprint. And it also encouraged new competition in telephone equipment markets. But the decree did not
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