166
Opinion of the Court
ing the "Judicial power of the United States"; and because Alabama has not waived its right to object to our exercise of that power.
This Court, however, has recently considered and rejected the very argument that the State now makes. In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18 (1990), we unanimously held that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases arising from state courts." Id., at 31. We explained:
"[I]t is 'inherent in the constitutional plan' . . . that when a state court takes cognizance of a case, the State assents to appellate review by this Court of the federal issues raised in the case 'whoever may be the parties to the original suit, whether private persons, or the state itself.' " Id., at 30 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934); Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 585 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting)).
Our holding in McKesson confirmed a long-established and uniform practice of reviewing state-court decisions on federal matters, regardless of whether the State was the plaintiff or the defendant in the trial court. 496 U. S., at 28; accord, General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 233 (1908) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]t was long ago settled" that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar "a writ of error to review the final judgment of a state court").
Although the State now asks us to "overrule McKesson," Brief for Respondents 27, it does not provide a convincing reason why we should revisit that relatively recent precedent, and we shall not do so. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 854-855 (1992) (considerations relevant to overruling precedent include workability of prior precedent, its relation to other changes in law, and relevant reliance).
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