Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 40 (1999)

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Cite as: 526 U. S. 172 (1999)

Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting

lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded' by that treaty to the United States . . . are hereby revoked; and all of the said Indians remaining on the lands ceded as aforesaid, are required to remove to their unceded lands." App. to Pet. for Cert. 565.

In deciding that this seemingly ironclad revocation was not effective as a matter of law, the Court rests its analysis on four findings. First, the Court notes that the President's power to issue the order must stem either from an Act of Congress or the Constitution itself. Second, the Court determines that the Executive Order was a "removal order." Third, the Court finds no authority for the President to order the Chippewa to remove from the ceded lands. And fourth, the Court holds that the portion of the Executive Order extinguishing the hunting and fishing rights is not severable from the "removal order" and thus also was illegal. I shall address each of these dubious findings in turn.

The Court's first proposition is the seemingly innocuous statement that a President's Executive Order must be authorized by law in order to have any legal effect. In so doing, the Court quotes our decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585 (1952), which held that President Truman's seizure of the steel mills by Executive Order during the Korean War was unlawful. However, the Court neglects to note that treaties, every bit as much as statutes, are sources of law and may also authorize Executive actions. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 680 (1981). In Dames & Moore, we noted that where the President acts with the implied consent of Congress in his Executive actions, "he exercises not only his own powers but also those delegated by Congress," and that such an action was entitled to high deference as to its legality. Id., at 668. This case involves an even stronger case for deference to Executive power than Dames & Moore, in which Presidential power under an Executive agreement was impliedly authorized by Congress, because the Executive Order in this

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