236
Opinion of the Court
substances] shall . . . be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, if (1) the replacement cost of the [controlled substance] was not less than $500, . . . or (3) another person was killed or suffered significant bodily injury as a result of such taking or attempt." § 2118(a)(3); see also § 2118(b)(3).5 A second model, § 2113 (bank robbery), as the Government concedes, see Brief for United States 17, makes related facts of violence, that is, assault and jeopardizing life by using a dangerous weapon, elements defining an aggravated form of that type of robbery. See §§ 2113(d), (e); cf. Almendarez-Torres, supra, at 231 (citing bank robbery statute as example of statute establishing greater and lesser included offenses); McMillan, 477 U. S., at 88 (contrasting § 2113(d) with provision defining a sentencing enhancement).
When pressed at oral argument, the Government proved unable to explain why Congress might have chosen one treatment of serious bodily harm or violence in defining two of the three offenses it used as its models for § 2119 and a different treatment in writing the carjacking statute itself, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-44, and we are unable to imagine a convincing reason ourselves. We thus think it fair to say that, as in the earlier robbery statutes, so in the carjacking statute, Congress probably intended serious bodily injury to be an element defining an aggravated form of the crime.
State practice bolsters the conclusion. Many States use causation of serious bodily injury or harm as an element defining a distinct offense of aggravated robbery. See, e. g., Ala. Code § 13A-8-41(a)(2) (1994) (robbery in the first degree defined in part by the causing of "serious physical injury");
5 The dissent, in passing, questions our view that § 2118(a) makes the causing of significant bodily injury an element of the offense defined by that section, see post, at 261-262, but it offers no reason to doubt our reading. Given that § 2118(a) establishes only one maximum punishment, and that it makes eligibility for such punishment contingent on the establishment of at least one of three facts, one of which is the causing of death or significant bodily injury, we think our reading is the only sensible one.
Page: Index Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007