Cite as: 526 U. S. 314 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
out consideration of petitioner's failure to testify. 122 F. 3d, at 192.
Other Circuits to have confronted the issue have held that a defendant retains the privilege at sentencing. See, e. g., United States v. Kuku, 129 F. 3d 1435, 1437-1438 (CA11 1997); United States v. Garcia, 78 F. 3d 1457, 1463 (CA10 1996); United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F. 2d 1307, 1312-1313 (CA1 1993); United States v. Hernandez, 962 F. 2d 1152, 1161 (CA5 1992); Bank One of Cleveland, N. A. v. Abbe, 916 F. 2d 1067, 1075-1076 (CA6 1990); United States v. Lugg, 892 F. 2d 101, 102-103 (CADC 1989); United States v. Paris, 827 F. 2d 395, 398-399 (CA9 1987). We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent Circuit conflict created by the Court of Appeals' decision, 524 U. S. 925 (1998), and we now reverse.
II
The Government maintains that petitioner's guilty plea was a waiver of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination with respect to all the crimes comprehended in the plea. We hold otherwise and rule that petitioner retained the privilege at her sentencing hearing.
A
It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the "waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination," Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-155 (1958). "The witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry," id., at 155. Nice questions will arise, of course, about the extent of the initial testimony and whether the ensuing questions are compre-
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