Cite as: 526 U. S. 358 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
tween the insurer and the insured, and consequently, is integral to that relationship." Ibid.5
The third McCarran-Ferguson factor—which asks whether the rule is limited to entities within the insurance industry— is also well met. As earlier explained, see supra, at 368- 373, California's notice-prejudice rule focuses on the insurance industry. The rule "does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it is aimed at it." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 61 (1990).
III
UNUM and its amici assert that even if the notice-prejudice rule is saved under 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), it is nonetheless preempted because it conflicts with substantive provisions of ERISA in three ways. UNUM first contends that the notice-prejudice rule, by altering the notice provisions of the insurance contract, conflicts with ERISA's requirement that plan fiduciaries act "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan. " § 1104(a)(1)(D). According to UNUM, § 1104(a)(1)(D) preempts any state law contrary to a written plan term. See Brief for Petitioner 32-33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.
UNUM's "contra plan term" argument overlooks controlling precedent and makes scant sense. We have repeatedly held that state laws mandating insurance contract terms are saved from preemption under § 1144(b)(2)(A). See Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 758 ("Massachusetts' mandated-benefit law is a 'law which regulates insurance' and so is not pre-empted by ERISA as it applies to insurance contracts
5 We reject UNUM's suggestion that because the notice-prejudice rule regulates only the administration of insurance policies, not their substantive terms, it cannot be an integral part of the policy relationship. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 728, n. 2 (including laws regulating claims practices and requiring grace periods in catalog of state laws that regulate insurance).
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