50
Opinion of the Court
under color of state law. Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach " 'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,' " Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1002 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948)).8
Perhaps hoping to avoid the traditional application of our state-action cases, respondents attempt to characterize their claim as a "facial" or "direct" challenge to the utilization review procedures contained in the Act, in which case, the argument goes, we need not concern ourselves with the "identity of the defendant" or the "act or decision by a private actor or entity who is relying on the challenged law." Brief for Respondents 16. This argument, however, ignores our repeated insistence that state action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible," and that "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 937 (1982); see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 156 (1978). In this case, while it may fairly be said that private insurers act " 'with the knowledge of and pursuant to' " the state statute, ibid. (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 162, n. 23 (1970)), thus satisfying the first requirement, respondents still must satisfy the second, whether the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State.9
8 Where, as here, deprivations of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are alleged, these two requirements converge. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 935, n. 18 (1982).
9 Respondents' reliance on Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478 (1988), as support for their position is misplaced. Nowhere in Tulsa did we characterize petitioner's claim as a "facial" or "direct" challenge to the Oklahoma "nonclaim" statute at issue there. Instead, we analyzed petitioner's challenge under our traditional two-step approach, requiring both action taken pursuant to state law and significant
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