Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999)

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574

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

Syllabus

RUHRGAS AG v. MARATHON OIL CO. et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit

No. 98-470. Argued March 22, 1999—Decided May 17, 1999

The underlying controversy stems from a venture to produce gas in the

North Sea's Heimdal Field. In 1976, respondents Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired respondent Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas in the Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70% of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including petitioner Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge (collectively Marathon) sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Marathon alleged that Ruhrgas had defrauded it into financing MPCN's development of the Heimdal Field and that Ruhrgas had diminished the value of the license Norge had assigned to MPCN. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction: diversity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. 1332, on the theory that Norge, the only nondiverse plaintiff, had been fraudulently joined; federal question, see 1331, because Marathon's claims raised questions of international relations; and 9 U. S. C. 205, which authorizes removal of cases relating to international arbitration agreements. Ruhrgas moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. The en banc Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist. The court derived "counsel against" recognizing judicial discretion to proceed directly to per-

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