638
Opinion of the Court
1998) (case below), and Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School Dist., 80 F. 3d 1006, 1008 (CA5) (holding that private damages action for student-on-student harassment is available under Title IX only where funding recipient responds to these claims differently based on gender of victim), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 861 (1996), with Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F. 3d 653, 668 (CA7 1998) (upholding private damages action under Title IX for funding recipient's inadequate response to known student-on-student harassment), vacated and remanded, post, p. 1142, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 132 F. 3d 949, 960-961 (CA4 1997) (same), vacated and District Court decision affirmed en banc, 169 F. 3d 820 (CA4 1999) (not addressing merits of Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claim and directing District Court to hold this claim in abeyance pending this Court's decision in the instant case), and Oona, R.-S.- v. McCaffrey, 143 F. 3d 473, 478 (CA9 1998) (rejecting qualified immunity claim and concluding that Title IX duty to respond to student-on-student harassment was clearly established by 1992-1993), cert. denied, post, p. 1154. We now reverse.
II
Title IX provides, with certain exceptions not at issue here, that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
Congress authorized an administrative enforcement scheme for Title IX. Federal departments or agencies with the authority to provide financial assistance are entrusted to promulgate rules, regulations, and orders to enforce the objectives of § 1681, see § 1682, and these departments or agencies may rely on "any . . . means authorized by law," including
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