Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 51 (1999)

Page:   Index   Previous  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  Next

Cite as: 526 U. S. 687 (1999)

Opinion of Souter, J.

and we have since then thought it "long . . . settled that there is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings," United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 18 (1970).2 See 12 C. Wright, A. Miller, & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3051, p. 224 (1997) ("It is absolutely settled that there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in compensation cases").

The reason that direct condemnation proceedings carry no jury right is not that they fail to qualify as "Suits at common law" within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee, for we may assume that they are indeed common law proceedings,3 see Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 376 (1876) ("The right of eminent domain always was a right at common law"); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 28 (1959) ("[A]n eminent domain proceeding is deemed for certain purposes of legal classification a 'suit at common law' "). The reason there is no right to

Constitution that it has been held repeatedly that it is a form of procedure within the power of the State to provide").

2 Similarly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a jury trial in state condemnation proceedings. See, e. g., Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 694 (1897); Crane, supra, at 147; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369 (1930).

3 Several commentators and courts have advanced theories that a condemnation proceeding is not an action at law, but rather is either some sort of special proceeding, or else an equitable proceeding. See, e. g., H. Mills & A. Abbott, Mills on Law of Eminent Domain § 84, p. 225 (2d ed. 1888); id., § 91, at 239 ("Condemnation is not an action at law, but an inquisition on the part of the state for the ascertainment of a particular fact, and may be conducted without the intervention of a jury"); 1A J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.105[1], p. 4-137 (rev. 3d ed. 1998) ("Condemnation proceedings are not suits at common law"). There is some accumulated support for the idea that condemnation proceedings derive from the writ ad quod damnum, which was issued by the courts of equity to the sheriff to conduct an inquest into the amount of damages incurred by a landowner as a result of the taking. Nonetheless, since Kohl v. United States, supra, at 376, the first case involving the Federal Govern-ment's exercise of its power of eminent domain, this Court has classified condemnation proceedings as suits at common law.

737

Page:   Index   Previous  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007