Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 63 (1999)

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Cite as: 526 U. S. 687 (1999)

Opinion of Souter, J.

Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 106 (1989), is the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause and no other.9 There is no separate cause of action for withholding process, and respondents in the instant case do not claim otherwise; they simply seek just compensation for their land, subject to the usual rules governing § 1983 liability and damages awards.10

c

Finally, it must be said that even if the tort analogue were not a failure, it would prove too much. For if the comparison to inverse condemnation were sound, it would be equally

9 Of course, § 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). Accord, Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F. 3d 469, 481 (CA7 1995) ("Because § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for violations of pre-existing rights, § 1983 claims must specifically allege a violation of the Constitution or 'laws' of the United States").

10 Respondents in this case sought damages for the fair market value of the property, interim damages for a temporary taking, holding costs, interest, attorney's fees, costs, and other consequential damages. Complaint pp. 14-15; First Amended Complaint pp. 16-17. The jury was instructed that in calculating damages: "[I]t's up to you to decide the difference in value, the fair market value as a result of the City's decision. Multiply it by an interest rate you think is appropriate, for a length of time you think is appropriate. So those are the three elements of computing the damages claimed if you determine the plaintiff is entitled to recover." 11 Record 1426. Respondents thus sought no incremental "damages" (beyond just compensation) for denial of state compensation procedures. Indeed, the only "damages" available in inverse condemnation cases is the just compensation measured by the value of the land. See supra, at 734. See, e. g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F. 2d 716 (CA11 1990). The fact that no further element of damages is recognized confirms rejection of the tort analogy, for it would be a peculiar tort indeed that did not recognize its concomitant injury in damages. Cf. Miller v. Campbell County, 854 P. 2d 71, 77 (Wyo. 1993) (rejecting reliance on tort law in holding that emotional distress is not a proper element of damages in inverse condemnation actions).

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