Cite as: 526 U. S. 838 (1999)
Souter, J., concurring
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, concurring.
I agree with the Court's strict holding that "the creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable" for purposes of federal habeas exhaustion. Ante, at 848. I understand the Court to have left open the question (not directly implicated by this case) whether we should construe the exhaustion doctrine to force a State, in effect, to rule on discretionary review applications when the State has made it plain that it does not wish to require such applications before its petitioners may seek federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, for example, has declared:
"[I]n all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies." In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 321 S. C. 563, 564, 471 S. E. 2d 454 (1990).
The Court is clear that "nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requir[es] federal courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available." Ante, at 847-848. Its citation of In re Exhaustion of State Remedies, for the proposition that the increased burden on state courts may be unwelcome, should not be read to suggest something more: that however plainly a State may speak its
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