Cite as: 527 U. S. 116 (1999)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
case does not end the matter. It may leave the question open for another day.
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
During a custodial interrogation, Mark Lilly told police officers that petitioner committed the charged murder. The prosecution introduced a tape recording of these statements at trial without making Mark available for cross-examination. In my view, that is a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation. See White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 364-365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial" and "extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"). Since the violation is clear, the case need be remanded only for a harmless-error determination. I therefore join Parts I, II, and VI of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment.
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and VI of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment. Though I continue to adhere to my view that the Confrontation Clause "extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial" and "is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial material, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions," White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365 (1992) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I agree with The Chief Justice that the Clause does not impose a "blanket ban on the government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant," post, at 147.
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