NASA v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229, 31 (1999)

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Cite as: 527 U. S. 229 (1999)

Thomas, J., dissenting

or representative when the Inspector General is given the discretion to decide whether, when, and how to conduct investigations. See 5 U. S. C. App. §§ 3(a), 6(a).9

The fact that information obtained in the course of OIG interviews is shared with agency management and sometimes forms the basis for employee discipline is similarly un-impressive. The Court suggests that when this happens, OIG and agency management act in "concert." Ante, at 242, n. 7. The truth of the matter is that upon receipt of information from OIG, agency management has the discretion to impose discipline but it need not do so. And OIG has no determinative role in agency management's decision. See 5 U. S. C. App. § 9(a) (Inspector General may not participate in the performance of agency management functions). Although OIG may provide information developed in the course of an investigation to agency management, so, apparently, does the FBI, the DEA, and local police departments. See, e. g., 63 Fed. Reg. 8682 (1998) (FBI's disclosure policy); 62 Fed. Reg. 36572 (1997) (Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Alien File and Central Index System); 62 Fed. Reg. 26555 (1997) (INS Law Enforcement Support Center

9 The Court posits, ante, at 241, that "nothing in the [Inspector General Act] indicates that, if the information had been supplied by the Administrator of NASA rather than the FBI, NASA-OIG would have had any lesser obligation to pursue an investigation." It appears shocked at the proposition that petitioners might think that "even when an OIG conducts an investigation in response to a specific request from the head of an agency, an employee engaged in that assignment is not a 'representative' of the agency within the meaning of [5 U. S. C.] § 7114(a)(2)(B)." Ibid. The answer to the Court is quite simple. So far as the Inspector General Act reveals, OIG has no obligation to pursue any particular investigation. And presumably the Court would agree that if NASA's Administrator referred a matter to the FBI or the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (who also, we are told, rely on agency management to compel an employee's appearance at an interview, Reply Brief for Petitioners 5-6), those independent agencies would not "represent" the agency. I fail to see how it is different when the investigatory unit, although independent from agency management, is housed within the agency.

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