Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 12 (1999)

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Cite as: 527 U. S. 308 (1999)

Opinion of the Court

well as the general availability of injunctive relief are not altered by [Rule 65] and depend on traditional principles of equity jurisdiction." 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2941, p. 31 (2d ed. 1995). We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity.

A

Respondents do not even argue this point. The United States as amicus curiae, however, contends that the preliminary injunction issued in this case is analogous to the relief obtained in the equitable action known as a "creditor's bill." This remedy was used (among other purposes) to permit a judgment creditor to discover the debtor's assets, to reach equitable interests not subject to execution at law, and to set aside fraudulent conveyances. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.8(1), pp. 191-192 (2d ed. 1993); 4 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 1415, pp. 1065-1066 (5th ed. 1941); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 26, p. 51 (rev. ed. 1940). It was well established, however, that, as a general rule, a creditor's bill could be brought only by a creditor who had already obtained a judgment establishing the debt. See, e. g., Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 497 (1923); Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 378-379 (1893); Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 457 (1893); National Tube Works Co. v. Ballou, 146 U. S. 517, 523-524 (1892); Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 113 (1891); Smith v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 398, 401 (1879); Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 411-413 (1861); see also 4 Symons, supra, at 1067; 1 Glenn, supra, § 9, at 11; F. Wait, Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors' Bills § 73, pp. 110- 111 (1884). The rule requiring a judgment was a product, not just of the procedural requirement that remedies at law had to be exhausted before equitable remedies could be pursued, but also of the substantive rule that a general creditor (one without a judgment) had no cognizable interest, either

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