Cite as: 527 U. S. 343 (1999)
Syllabus
(1) This inquiry demands a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270. This judgment should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations. Ibid. Pp. 357-358.
(2) For postjudgment monitoring performed before the PLRA's effective date, the attorney's fees provisions have a retroactive effect contrary to the usual assumption that statutes are prospective in operation. The attorneys in both cases below had a reasonable expectation that work they performed before the PLRA's enactment would be compensated at the pre-PLRA rates set by the District Court. The PLRA, as applied to work performed before its effective date, would alter the fee arrangement post hoc by reducing the compensation rate. To give effect to the PLRA's fees limitations, after the fact, would attach new legal consequences to completed conduct. Landgraf, supra, at 270. The Court rejects petitioners' contention that the application of a new attorney's fees provision is proper in that fees questions do not change the parties' substantive obligations because they are collateral to the main cause of action. When determining whether a new statute operates retroactively, it is not enough to attach a label (e. g., "procedural," "collateral") to the statute; it must be asked whether the statute operates retroactively, as does the PLRA. Petitioners also misplace their reliance on Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696, 720-721. Unlike the situation here, the award of statutory attorney's fees in that case did not upset any reasonable expectations of the parties. See Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 276-279. Thus, in the absence of an express command by Congress to apply the PLRA retroactively, the Court declines to do so. Id., at 280. Pp. 358-360.
(3) With respect to postjudgment monitoring performed after the PLRA's effective date, by contrast, there is no retroactive effect, and the PLRA fees cap applies to such work. On April 26, 1996, through the PLRA, the plaintiffs' attorneys were on notice that their hourly rate had been adjusted. From that point forward, they would be paid at a rate consistent with the law's dictates, and any expectation of compensation at the pre-PLRA rates was unreasonable. The Court rejects respondents' contention that the PLRA has retroactive effect in this context because it attaches new legal consequences (a lower pay rate) to conduct completed before enactment, the attorney's initial decision to file suit on behalf of prisoners. That argument is based on the erroneous assumption that the attorney's initial decision to file a case is irrevocable. Respondents do not seriously contend that the attorneys here were prohibited from withdrawing from the case during the postjudgment monitoring stage. Pp. 360-361.
143 F. 3d 246, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
345
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